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ARTICLE No. 51

RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
SEVERANCE UNION MEDICAL COLLEGE
SEOUL, CHOSEN, (KOREA)

SYDNEY
THE AUSTRALASIAN MEDICAL PUBLISHING COMPANY,
LIMITED
1928



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AN HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BODY AND MIND.

By C. I. McLAREN, M.D. (Melbourne),
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Karshish, the picker-up of learning's crumbs,
The not-incurious in God's handiwork
(This man's flesh He hath admirably made,
Blown like a bubble, kneaded like a paste,
To coop up and keep down on earth a space,
That puff of vapour from His mouth, man's soul).

BROWNING.

PART I.

A former distinguished Professor of Physiology in the University of Melbourne once met the old question, "What is to be done when doctors differ?" with the witty suggestion, "Call in more doctors." The profession to which I have the honour to belong, has proved itself consistently loyal to that advice, and with like consistency I have permitted myself, where the doctors of philosophy have been differing down the centuries concerning the relationship of body and mind, to become one of the "more doctors" self-summoned to the consultation. To those two things, the starry heaven above, and the moral imperative within, which brought awe to the mind of Kant, I have often thought there might well be added a third: this fact of relationship between body and mind.

As a medical man, it is natural that I should approach the subject by affirming—for it seems to me to be a verified fact of experience—the dependence of mind on body. The evidence for such affirmation is to be found writ large in the sciences of biology, neurology and physiology, in the practice of medicine and in the facts of life. Biology reveals an ascending scale of consciousness related with an increase in size and complexity of brain structure. At the top of the scale is man with his huge convoluted cerebrum and its millions of nerve cells. It is possible, moreover, to establish some relationship between degrees of intelligence in different persons and the number of nerve cells present, particularly cells in the superficial layer of the cortex known as the supragranular layer. The findings of Shaw Bolton and the application by Professor Berry of these findings to the classification of abnormal and delinquent children, are significant facts. As is well known, it is possible also to establish relationship between injury to

the brain, even to particular parts of the brain, and corresponding special alterations in the memory. Types of aphasia suggest themselves as examples. The recent work of Henry Head has modified some of our ideas about localization of cerebral function, but the fact of relationship between localized brain areas and particular function remains as one of the important working principles in neurological practice.

There are other striking manifestations of change of mentality and of personality caused by injury of the brain. For instance, quite commonly the particular irritability of a patient is found to be associated with an inflammatory condition of the brain or its coverings. Another significant fact is that sometimes when organic disease of the brain has taken place, the first manifestation thereof is a slight psychic change in the individual. For instance, a child at school who before has been docile and amiable becomes intractable and naughty, and months after the cause may show itself as a tubercular meningitis. Another example of psychic abnormality associated with commencing organic disease is the subtle change that occurs in general paralysis of the insane. The incidence of that disease, in its early stages, falls on the highest nerve cells, and the first symptoms which develop are psychical. The account of the disease which Sir Frederick Mott gives in the Oxford Text Book of Medicine, is much more than an ordinary description of medical symptoms; it is a striking psychological study of a changed personality. Yet another familiar instance of changed mentality caused by bodily abnormality, is the disease called myxœdema, where, as the result of deficiency in thyroid function, there may come about a practical absence of mentality. One of the most striking advances in medicine was that marked by the treatment of these patients with animal thyroid gland and their restoration, in favourable cases, to bodily and mental health. In view of these and many similar facts one does not need to labour the point that mind is seen to be dependent on body.

But there is another set of facts which equally challenges recognition; it has proved itself no easy matter to give balanced recognition to the two sets of facts. Many persons when confronted in Nature by what looks like a contradiction, escape from their difficulty by refusing half the evidence. There is a story of a countryman at the zoo who saw for the first time an elephant. He looked first at its tail, next earnestly at its trunk; then, as he turned away, was heard to exclaim: "I don't believe it!" In a similar spirit of denial men have propounded theories which admit no place in Nature

for mind as a real function. If our theories about the Universe are not wide enough to include mind as a functioning entity, the obvious thing to do is to change our theories. We cannot fit the Universe on the Procrustean bed of our theories; ultimately, it is the theory that must be made to fit the facts.

It must be admitted that there is real difficulty for us whose training has been that of the medical schools, in harmonizing the ideas of free will and the psychic origin of disease with our belief in the law of the conservation of energy. It may be that, had our training in physics been more advanced or our knowledge of philosophy more profound, our difficulties might have been fewer. But our training is as it is, and the difficulties are real.

Hughlings Jackson, a great man, whose name will live in neurology, felt the difficulty so acutely that to him the suggestion of the psychic origin of certain types of epilepsy appeared worse than useless; the idea, to his mind, would bring chaos into that ordered system of physical cause and effect into which, not only the physics, but the physiology and the medicine of his day had been compassed.

In our day, the conclusions of the relativist mathematicians have profoundly modified the old simple faith in the law of the conservation of energy. One authority writing in the *Philosophical Magazine* has declared that the law has become to the relativists "a mathematical fiction." Nor do the philosophers exercise themselves much over the problem.¹ Indeed, to us medical men the philosophers seem to suffer from a provoking inability to understand that there is any real difficulty. They are content to tell us that the idea, accepted almost as an axiom by many physicians, of a physical closed system into which no psychic forces can enter, is a mere abstraction and an artificial postulate. The views of the relativists and the philosophers cannot be disregarded, but it is as a medical man on whom these difficulties have pressed that I come to the discussion.

For the sake of my argument I shall concede the theory that has been advanced by the mechanistic school concerning the passage of nervous impulses through the nervous system. I shall then endeavour to show that even with such a theory, it is still possible to admit the idea of real freedom and reject that of mechanically determined reaction.

Let it be assumed then that an afferent impulse enters the nervous system, that it passes to the cortex, that there it arrives at a point of dividing synaptic paths (the synapse

¹ Vide McDougall's "Body and Mind" for a philosophic survey of the case.

being the place of apposition of processes of two nerve cells). There is evidence to suggest that consciousness is associated in a special way with the passage of nerve impulses across synaptic junctions in the cortex of the cerebrum. The afferent impulse enters from the periphery, reaches the cortex, passes through synaptic junctions, and finally emerges as an efferent impulse manifesting itself in some form of action. In the simplest case, one might conceive a nerve cell in the cortex with a process receiving the incoming impulse and two processes, (*a*) and (*b*), along either of which the outgoing impulse might proceed. If the impulse proceeds by (*a*) there is, let us say, a positive response; if by (*b*) a negative response. The conception suggests a railway train with lines and points. If the points are on one setting, the train takes one course; if on the other, the alternative course.

If such be the physical basis, it has then been argued (1) that either the points are physiologically and physically set by heredity, environment, and a hundred causes, so that there can be no such thing as real freedom, and everything in the universe, the response of the "free will" individual included, is physically determined; or (2) that, if "free will" be seriously postulated as acting in such a system, then, by it, synaptic paths must be opened and shut; further, that this involves some physical force, however minute, to bring about movement of the points; and that this in turn is an infringement of the law of the conservation of energy; for that law lays down that the energy disappearing from one side of a physical system (in this case the afferent nerve process and nervous impulse) reappears in amount, neither more nor less, on the other side of the system (here the efferent).

Before advancing a solution for the dilemma thus presented, I define my position by saying that I reject a "vitalistic" explanation of physiological phenomena. So far as I understand it, vitalism says that physics are physics up to a certain point and that then, within the living organism, life comes in and alters physics so that physical reaction in the organism no longer conforms to ordinary physical laws. Of such anomalous action I cannot discern convincing evidence, although I admit it would be improper to deny the possibility on *a priori* grounds. It may readily be conceded that physical reactions are more elusively complicated than the old physical science at all conceived. For example, as already noted, the law of the conservation of energy may, as physics, be found to have less than universal validity; nevertheless, simple, or complex, physical reaction, *qua* physical reaction, whether in the living body or in the inorganic

world, has not, in my opinion, been demonstrated to be other than uniform. I find myself in agreement in this contention with Professor Haldane. Dr. Haldane assails the mechanistic interpretation of physiology, but he is equally uncompromising in his rejection of vitalism, and assures us that he is "neither neo-vitalist nor paleo-vitalist." I (with, I think, Dr. Haldane) would suppose that, in the cell, physics and chemistry remain physics and chemistry; with him, it would seem to me there must be recognized in the functioning cell a new category of existence, the category of life. Dr. Haldane has well said that the progress of physiological investigation during a generation has taught us much of how finely the chemistry of the body is balanced; it has taught us nothing of how it is finely balanced. Or, as I have heard it put, physical experiment does not answer the question: What balances the balance?

With this explanation of my position, I return to the dilemma that has been presented. The analogy of the railway points may be substantially true. I advance the suggestion that the function of living cortical brain cell may be to hold an absolute and theoretically perfect balance of the "points" in the way out for a nerve impulse between the two diverging paths. By the hypothesis there is, and can be, no physical bias to determine. The dilemma as between determinism and a breach of the law of conservation has disappeared, for in such a system as I have postulated non-physical influence alone is competent to give right of way to nerve impulse along the appropriate path. Thought, "free will," emerges as the new creative reality determining the issue.

The question may be asked: What evidence is there that "free will" does, in fact, act in the way postulated? I reply that I am not concerned to prove that "free will" does act in the special fashion, or only in the fashion, which I have suggested. I am concerned to demonstrate that the conception of "free will" is not logically and inherently incompatible with the facts of physics and physiology; I believe that my suggestion justifies my contention.

So far, my argument has sought to show (for many minds, I know, it is but labouring the obvious) that the facts do not make inevitable a materialistic conclusion. Further, such a conclusion is actually untenable, as the following considerations suggest. If matter always acts on mind (as the materialists affirm) and never mind on matter, we have, as

the late Professor Laurie reminds us, the sort of reciprocity unknown in Nature of which the Irishman complained that "it was all on one side."

Consciousness has been called an epiphenomenon, a sort of shadow. But in fact mind does act on matter and it is a strange shadow which influences the substances which it shadows. I have seen patients sick in body, paralysed and helpless; my epiphenomenal shadow has affected their epiphenomenal shadow and the patient has got up, walked about, recovered and put on flesh. I cannot believe, after such experience, that mind does not genuinely act on matter. It is a significant fact, and seriously invalidates the materialistic theory, that theory and practice do not agree. It is probably not too much to say that there never was a consistent materialist, surely none among the practising nerve specialists.

Nevertheless, an escape from a materialistic interpretation has presented difficulties. For evidence may be adduced that mental activity does not occur with the absence of nerve cell and the stimulation of such cell by peripheral stimulus. "No neuron, no mind," is a familiar dictum; one might go further and say: no peripheral stimulus, no mental activity. An infant deprived of peripheral stimulation (sight, hearing, etc.) grows up an "ament by deprivation." There is the classical instance of a patient deaf and without cutaneous sensibility and with sight in only one eye; when this closed, the patient went to sleep. These facts have been interpreted to prove that in the final analysis, mentality is a type of physical energy appearing as a result of physical stimulus. But is it? I answer in a fairy tale. If the fairy tale does not end quite rightly, I crave indulgence in this my first incursion into imaginative literature. Once upon a time there was a fairy prince, charming and with all the other attributes one could wish for in a fairy prince. However, he was eccentric in his diet. From the day he had been weaned of mother's milk, our prince could be induced to touch but one article of diet—birds, always and only birds. Now, there was in the neighbouring kingdom a beautiful princess. She was not only beautiful but cultured as well. She had, indeed, graduated from the local university and had specialized in pneumatics. She knew all there was to know about air. They met and eventually they were married; but they did not live happy ever after. The truth must be told. The princess, for all her loveliness, was the victim of a peculiar form of selective amblyopia, and the one thing she could not see was—birds. She became mystified about what the prince ate. Nothing that she ordered from the royal kitchens was ever touched. She

was wounded and chagrined. But her scientific bent of mind asserted itself. She watched the prince as he sallied forth with his gun: he was going to shoot birds. She soon established the fact that his diet was connected with air. There were obvious difficulties; for sometimes (if he happened on a neighbour's aviary) there was much sustenance and a minimum of air, at other times all the atmosphere in the wide dome of heaven—on days when birds were few—scarce appeased her lord's hunger. Still, one thing was certain: No air, no food. Though she could not reduce it to a mathematical formula by which air and nourishment were seen to be related one as a function of the other, still our amblyopic princess was finally driven to the conclusion that her avivorous prince lived on air. I have only to add that with the best intentions in the world she had a forced draught installed to play on the prince's place at table. Unhappily the unfortunate man caught a cold, developed broncho-pneumonia, and died. Now in point of fact, this untimely tragedy was due to a mistaken judgment, for the prince did *not* live on air, though he did live on something in the air, but quite different from air, to wit, birds. And the moral of all this is that mentality does not depend on nerve impulse and physical stimulus as such. It depends on something in this universe of matter and motion, but quite different from matter and motion, to wit, meaning. And the amblyopic materialist cannot see meaning.

Or let me put it another way. There was once a mathematical class, and it met under some very serious disabilities. The lecture room was so cold that the students were frozen to distraction; they were half starved, too; and the lecturer had so poor a voice that what he said could not be heard. The class made poor progress in mathematics. But a happy improvement was effected; the room was warmed; the students' diet was brought up to standard; and the lecturer was induced to speak up. A gratifying advance became apparent in the class's mathematical attainment. At this stage a new director of studies appeared on the scene. I think he must have come direct from Gulliver's island of Laputa. He was ambitious for the best examination results. He enquired into the circumstances that had led up to the recent improvement in the students' results. He decided to spare no expense. He had fires built in the lecture room big enough to roast an ox, or an ass. He arranged for the forced feeding of the students and had electric amplifiers installed which worked so effectively that the students were deafened with the roar of the lecturer's voice; but it did not help the mathematics one bit. And the reason that it did not help is

this, that the only road to mathematical attainment is the road of perception of mathematical meaning through directing the attention to mathematical ideas, and not all the typhoons in the China Sea are sufficient to provide peripheral stimulus enough to make one jot or tittle of mathematics in a man's mind. The fact is that the physical organ (the brain) and the physical stimulus (nerve impulse) are important, indeed essential, to provide the material basis for mental activity; they are of great negative importance also in that injury or deterioration of the brain destroys or distorts mentality. The converse, that the brain may be stimulated by peripheral stimulus to produce ideas is, in spite of all the scientific erudition which has been marshalled to support the view, nonsense; and all the schools and all the universities in the world, by their very existence, proclaim the fact that ideas are formed and thought induced by something other than matter in motion.

One final word about the materialistic theory of mental activity. It has been said that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. I do not take exception to this analogy on the usual ground taken by the idealist in considering the question, namely that the analogy is too mechanical and that there is this important difference between thought and bile, that thought though it may be ponderous, is never ponderable. My criticism is, that the analogy is not mechanical enough. It purports to throw light on an obscure problem by introducing an unconvincing comparison with another little understood and obscure activity, the secretion of bile by the living hepatic cell; for that process is not to be dismissed as a merely mechanical one; the one thing we certainly do know about it is, that it is a function of living cell.

I have dealt thus at some length with the materialistic theory because it was at the price of much thought that I obtained my freedom from its fallacies. The other principal theories concerning the relation of body and mind, which have been advanced, I shall but mention. Parallelism says that mind and matter move on by some pre-arranged harmony, but neither ever has any effect on the other. I know a small child who has not yet learned to express the relation of difference between two objects. She puts it in this way: The two things are "just the same, but not quite." The theory of parallelism reminds me of that.

Thorough-going subjective idealism makes us responsible for the material universe. Joseph got into trouble merely for

dreaming that the sun and moon and stars bowed down on him. This theory makes us each responsible for having "put up the whole show."

Bergson deals with matter and spirit each as realities. He holds, if I understand him, that the brain does not function as the organ of ideas, but as the instrument of the body's action and reaction to the total environment.

Finally, there is the interactionist theory, to which, in recent years, McDougall has given able advocacy. To me, some form of dualism seems inevitable; at the same time, simply to accept the two facts, matter and mind, to admit that they interact and yet to conceive of them as, in their nature, totally diverse one from the other, is unsatisfactory and unsatisfying. The contribution to thought which the situation calls for is the revealing of some quality or essence in mind and matter which is common to both and which so makes interaction of one on the other a thing intelligible and congruous. To the elucidation of this problem, then, I address myself.

Concerning the nature of mind I do not propose to say more than this: we know from immediate experience that when mind or spirit is most truly free it is expressing itself in accordance with laws of rationality and creative activity. The nature of matter demands closer examination. To different minds it presents itself in different aspects. To the happy child the world may appear as fit setting for the best of fairy tales. For the pessimism of Bertrand Russell "blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way." To the mind without scientific bent or training, the world is a strange conglomeration of unrelated things and happenings. Nor is this pre-scientific mind a thing of other climes and days. On a farm where I spent a boyhood holiday was a buggy-house built on an incline sloping down from the entrance. Naturally, if the buggy wheels were not properly chocked, there was trouble with the buggy. I remember once drawing the attention of the farmer's wife to the moving vehicle as it commenced to take the decline. Her comment was: "That's the way with that buggy; it won't stay in the shed." Truly pre-scientific!

To the scientific mind, nature presents a very different aspect; and the progress of science discloses the relating of the world of nature to the world of reason, and increasingly reveals that things which to the untutored eye appear as accidental and unrelated are in reality part of a rational order. A Newton appears, and literally in his mental grasp

he takes the astronomical universe and finds it docile, a universe which moves according to laws, the laws of reason. What Newton did in astronomy is being done in all branches of science. It has been done conspicuously in modern physics in the ultra-atomic world. The physicists declare that, in its ultra-atomic essence, matter is electrical, made up of electrons. And what is electricity? In answer to that question Bertrand Russell replies: "Electricity is a way in which things behave, it is not like red paint, a substance which can be put on the electron." In another place the same author says that the electron is "a logical fiction." If we may take that word fiction, not in its present degraded usage, but with its original meaning of "something fashioned," we arrive at conclusions of arresting scientific and philosophic implication.

The next step in my argument has been made possible by the work of a thinker whose conclusions have greatly influenced my own mind. To adapt words used by Matthew Arnold in reference to his father; a brother of Bruce McLaren¹ may say of him what any man might say, that he was gifted with singular mathematical and physical insight. His work was mathematics, his meat and drink was to attain to a philosophical understanding of reality; and mathematical physics was his instrument to this end. He travelled, with its pioneers, the road which the relativist mathematicians have opened. Niels-Bohr visited him that they might discuss the problems which the new conceptions of the electron were raising. Through all this work the question that enthralled his interest was: What in its ultimate constitution and essence is this thing of electrons and protons men call matter? He embodied his answer to that question (see "A Theory of Gravity," *Phil. Mag.*, 1913) in this sentence: "To me, as to Hegel, matter is objectified thought." The idea of thought that has taken form may seem to some meaningless; to me, the more I probe it, the more, the deeper, its significance. Nor should the idea present special difficulty to our mechanical age. Henry Ford had a thought thirty years ago; that single thought has taken some fifteen million forms and in the words of the Ford advertisements: "Wherever you go, you see them, and wherever you see them, they go." Electrons are a good deal like that, but there are more of them and they go faster.

This idea of thought that has taken form, comes to us not only as an attainment of modern mathematical philosophic

¹ Professor S. B. McLaren was killed in France in 1916.

thought: it comes also fraught with the wisdom of the ancients; for both Hebrew and Hellenic thought bear witness to the same truth. In a recent number of the *Quarterly Journal* an authority on Greek literature, Miss Stawell, has written:

Nothing is more characteristic of Greek speculation than the belief that underlying Nature there existed intelligible Ideas, Forms transparent to thought, which pressed for embodiment in actuality, through which alone we could understand the world and which had a right to be called divine.

The testimony of Hebrew thought is even more explicit. The idea is present at the beginning of that literature and informs all its pages. One might paraphrase the first chapter of Genesis and say: "God said, let there be an ordered cosmos; and there was an ordered cosmos."

This idea of matter as thought that has taken form, applicable to inorganic matter, becomes pregnant with new meaning when carried into the world of life. The term biology connotes, of course, that exact and ordered description which men of science have given about living forms. But the question suggests itself: What makes it possible that there should be an "ology" about life or about any of the thousand and one other subjects of which there have been scientific treatises? Bertrand Russell says that the universe is a huge chaotic accident and that out of this abysmal irrationality there has emerged by "a collocation of atoms" that fleck of transient rationality, man's mind, which weaves for itself the order of the sciences. None can deny Mr. Russell's intellectual gifts. One can only marvel that the human mind can so stultify itself and so distort the image of the cosmos as to believe that the only reason in the universe is the reason which man had made by a figment out of that in which no reason is.

To the simple mind the simple suggestion comes that all the "ologies" are made possible because Nature herself, before all description, is instinct with reason, or as the Greeks called it, *logos*. Biology is a possibility and has become an actuality as a science because the *logos* is, and is in life. To my mind, an interpretation of biology emerges only as we discern in the evolutionary process the *logos* manifesting itself in and through that process. This idea has but to be stated, and the mind leaps to the profound prologue to St. John's Gospel: "The Word [*Logos*] became flesh and dwelt among us."

PART II.

The most important aspect of the hypothesis is perhaps its application to the diagnosis and treatment of mental disease. Unless there emerges the pragmatic importance which attaches to a theory which works, it has little value for those of us who are seeking to give affirmative answer to the question: "Physician, canst thou not minister to a mind diseased?"

In the approach to the subject of mental disease, it is of cardinal importance that we should be clear whether or not there is such a thing as mental disease of purely mental origin. Even this subject is still in debate among practising specialists in mental disease. It is almost axiomatic in the thought of many medical men that where mental disease is, there necessarily abnormality of brain cells must be, and be in a causal relation to the disease. This opinion is confirmed by an argument which (on critical examination) is found to run thus: Serious disease of the brain causes mental disease; mental disease previously thought to be without organic basis has been shown, with refinements in methods of examination of the brain, to have organic basis; therefore all mental disease must have causal organic basis. The inference is clearly unwarranted in logic and is also, I believe, not in accordance with the facts.

The readiness with which physical malady is assumed to be the cause of mental aberration is well illustrated by an amusing incident in my personal experience. One of the major hardships which I have suffered from my life in Korea has been that, for a while, I had the responsibility for keeping the hospital books; and I cannot do arithmetic. I am enough of a Freudian to entertain the suggestion that the reason why I cannot do arithmetic is that I don't want to do arithmetic and don't want to keep hospital books. Be that as it may, I have suffered much, for each addition of a column of figures provides the novelty of a new result. I was struggling one evening with my task, when a friendly visitor in the home came forward with a generous offer of assistance. The offer

was promptly accepted. We worked for a while; then came a kind and solicitous enquiry: "Have you a headache to-night?" But I had no headache nor other brain or bodily disease.

No, we cannot argue from mental confusion to brain poisoning or even brain cell deficiency as a cause of the confusion. Psychic results often have psychic causes, and psychic causes only. Mental abnormality may arise from abnormality of psychism, and a strong confirmation of this fact is the other fact that grave disease of mental function is constantly being cured by direct appeal to the psyche.

If there be such a thing as disease of psychic origin, it is, next, of enormous importance to differentiate between physical and psychic factors, as a cause of symptoms; also to recognize how far and in what manner either has contributed in a particular case. Unless these elementary necessities are regarded in diagnosis, we shall inevitably fall into grievous errors in treatment.

I offer a simple classification of mental abnormality, on the basis of causation. I divide the assaults to which the human spirit is exposed into (*a*) the indirect and (*b*) the direct. The indirect class is due to injury to, or poisoning of, the brain; the direct class is psychical, and affects the mind, usually through the emotions and the will.

It is a fact that has seemed to some so incongruous as almost to be incredible that the mind of man ("in apprehension how like a god") is not merely dependent upon, but actually may be changed by, physical injury to the brain. Yet it is not too much to say that the physics and chemistry of the body—more particularly of the brain—are part and parcel of the personality. The man who is dealing solely with ideas and philosophies may almost overlook this fact, but we medical men are constantly being reminded that injury to the brain, or abnormality of the chemistry of the blood, brings about the subtlest and the gravest changes in the mind. The suggestion has been advanced—and it merits investigation—that a considerable proportion of the divorce suits in America involve women whose temper and disposition have become abnormal as the result of thyroid gland dysfunction and the deficiency of iodine which is part of such thyroid disease. Iodine is not a specific against divorce, but the connection between physical and mental ill is far closer than is sometimes recognized, even by those of us who are medically trained. Nor is there essential incongruity in the connection.

In an important article in *The British Medical Journal*, June, 1927, Professor Haldane re-emphasizes his contention

that, in considering the nature of disease, we must commence with a conception which transcends mere physics and chemistry. A new category is necessary—Life. For the living organism there exists that which we characterize as health, or the normal. This normal the organism, by its self-determining activity, continuously seeks to maintain; to this normal it seeks to return when injury or poisoning has caused a departure therefrom. The environment must be such that the organism may selectively take to itself out of the whole environment the due proportions in mass and volume of those elements which shall make up the normal constitution of the organism and shall maintain its normal function. Organism and environment are then related, related as the Greek philosophers might say, in accordance with "reason." But there occur circumstances in which, on account of violence or poisoning, the environment becomes inimical to the organism. Structure is damaged and function disturbed. No longer can the organism establish harmony for itself out of the chaos of its environment. At such times, the relation of environment and organism is no longer according to reason. The world has become, for that organism, as we anthropomorphically, but I think properly, say, a senseless world.

What is true of the health and function of the lower organism is true also of the physiology of man. A man sustains a brain injury from a bursting enemy shell; intellect is clouded, personality is warped. Why? Because human personality is compacted of mind and body and as such requires a "reasonable" physical environment. A bursting enemy shell, contrived of human hate, is not a reasonable environment. Such facts exist; they are irrational facts. They are not irrational facts, if viewed as part of a merely physical order; for exploding shells continue to obey the laws of physics and chemistry however precious those persons may be whom the explosion injures. They are not irrational facts either, perchance, in the perspective of "that far off divine event to which the whole creation moves." Yet in a very real and practical sense they are irrational.

While the evidence for an indirect attack upon the human personality is overwhelming, there is a great deal of loose thinking and inadequate statement about the nature of symptoms which supervene as a result of poisoning and injury to the brain. One quasi-scientific statement, often made, is that after injury and poisoning the latest acquired characteristics are the first to disappear. Further, under the influence of uncritical evolutionary thought, credence is given to the

dictum that with deterioration of brain cells there emerge from the subconscious depths of human nature the ape, the tiger (or perhaps the donkey), of man's family tree. We are told, further, that the mentality of the child bears witness to the truth of such ideas; and the followers of Freud have advanced theories meriting the designation, "fantastic," in support of their views. An able English neurologist writing on the subject, "The Nervous Child," has said that such Freudian writers would demonstrate more of the scientific spirit if, instead of reconstructing the child mind from theories based upon abnormal adult mentality, they repaired to the nursery and the kindergarten and acquainted themselves there with children.

Medical literature has failed to furnish discriminating description of what follows after deterioration of brain cells. For instance, the classical description of the irritability appearing after concussion of the brain is that the patient lies curled up in bed, resents being disturbed and resists attention, perhaps with profanity. I have already referred to the striking psychological study, by Sir Frederick Mott, of early changes in general paralysis of the insane. But one factor of first class importance seems to have been overlooked. No reference is made to the previous character and training of the individual affected. How far do identical injuries manifest themselves by widely different symptoms, such difference depending on differences in previous character and training? My experience leads me to believe that such differences are profound.

I contrast, for instance, the horrors of the *delirium tremens*, which often complicates pneumonia in the type of case one sees in the refractory ward of a metropolitan hospital, with the delirium of another pneumonia case which I was called upon to treat. The patient had spent the first half of his adult life as a builder of church and state in a cannibal island in the South Seas, and the latter half of it in ministering to the outcast lepers in Korea. The pneumonia toxin in the two types of cases was similar. The resultant delirium was profoundly different. In the second case the delirium was a paean of triumph and gratitude and praise.

I knew a man who had devoted a life of strenuous service to the Christian ministry in an industrial suburb. He was smitten with a chronic degenerative disease of the nervous system. Gradually he was deprived of his faculties. I was with him the night he died. The mutterings of his last hours bore testimony to a spirit moving in realms of idealism loftier than those to which most men ever attain.

Although this subject has received too scant attention, from medical observers, it has been dealt with by some of the masters of literature, among them John Bunyan. His treatment of it serves to give point to the old medical adage: "Experience is difficult, judgment is fallacious." For instance, when Christian is passing through the valley of the shadow of death, "one of the wicked ones got behind him and whisperingly suggested many grievous blasphemies to him which he verily believed proceeded from his own mind." Again, when he passes through the river, "he had horror of mind and was troubled with apparitions of hobgoblins and evil spirits." At the same time Christian's companion, Hopeful, was little distressed; moreover, such feeble pilgrims as Mr. Despondency and Mr. Ready-to-Halt pass over the river triumphantly. Nor is this all, for one, Mr. Ignorance, who is no pilgrim at all, passes over "and that without half the difficulty of Christian and Hopeful."

As a partial explanation of these apparent inconsistencies in the production of symptoms, I advance this suggestion: Physical injury acts in the production of symptoms in two ways: it serves either (i) as an amplifier, or (ii) as a muffler of qualities already in the personality. By this twofold process of exaggerating some attributes and diminishing others, there is brought about a distortion from the normal, but there is not imported anything new into the personality. From two of the cases I have quoted, there appears evidence that it may be possible to build a personality so firmly and rightly integrated that no assault or poisoning of brain cell can mar its highest and most essential quality, that which is central in the personality. With degeneration of the brain tissue consciousness at length disappears, but its passing from our vision may be likened to the triumph of the gallant admiral whose vessel sinks but with flag flying.

The second division of mental disease I have characterized as arising from a direct attack upon the human spirit. Life and literature both attest such causation of mental disease. The wisdom of Shakespeare puts into the mouth of the physician attending Lady Macbeth these words:

Un-natural deeds do breed un-natural troubles:

Infected minds to their deaf pillows will discharge their secrets.
More she needs the divine than the physician.

Many of the important causes of this direct attack are enumerated by the English Church litany when it says:

From all blindness of heart, from vainglory and hypocrisy; from envy, hatred and malice and all uncharitableusness; from fornication and all other deadly sin and from all the deceits of the world, the flesh and the devil, Good Lord, deliver us.

These things in the environment in which we live, and especially when taken into the life, are capable of producing devastating effects on the susceptible mentality. It deserves, I think, to be noted that an unsuitable environment may have a determining influence in bringing about mental disease. An eminent authority in proposing a definition of insanity suggests the formula: "A person is insane when he *cannot* think the thoughts, feel the feelings, and do the deeds of the society to which he belongs." I have a fundamental criticism to offer of the definition. It accepts, as the norm, existing standards of society, and tacitly demands conformity thereto on pain of ostracism from reason. It may well be that the individual is sane, and that it is the society about him which is deluded and perverted from right conduct. The case of Socrates and others suggest themselves. Further, the responsibility for the insanity of the individual lies very often at the door of society. For instance, a certain savage African tribe is said to be so held by its superstitions that it is demanded that the first girl baby of a family be put to death. It is not difficult to imagine a young mother torn to mental derangement between a mother's tender regard for her offspring and her fears concerning the tribal superstitions. Nor does one need to go to savage Africa to discover all the elements of disintegrating dilemmas. Neither money nor power satisfies the human soul, yet these are the molochs to which society and the nations have time and time again paid homage, demanding meanwhile that every individual should so worship.

In the Prayer Book list one notes the phrase "from fornication and all other deadly sin." In view of the emphasis that Freud has put on sex as producing mental disease this phrase is interesting. Freud is right in attaching importance to sex, but it would seem to me the Prayer Book is more right in that it recognizes sex and sex perversion in a perspective which includes other, and perhaps subtler, assaults on the human spirit.

The question arises: If such factors as these are causative in mental disease, how comes it that good people become mentally deranged? To that question I would answer first, and in the words of Christ: "There is none good but one." I would hasten to add, again in His words: "They on whom the tower of Siloam fell were not sinners above others in Jerusalem."

There is another aspect of the problem which deserves to be noted; and I write here from experience and from an intimate knowledge of the stresses through which some have passed. Our minds are finite; weak vessels of flesh and blood

contain them; but a "spark disturbs the clod." The demands of the moral imperative and the infinite requirements of holiness pursue men. Little wonder that the human personality, wrestling with issues such as these—for there are those who face these issues—is shaken to its depths, and that sometimes mental derangement results.

The distinction which I have drawn between the physical and the psychic origin of mental disease calls for a like differentiation in the treatment to be adopted. Inasmuch as cause and effect, physical and psychic, are so intimately inter-related, the problem of treatment in a particular case becomes a nice one. It is therefore all the more important that our distinctions be definite, and especially that there be recognition of what are legitimate expectations in treatment. What may we look for from physical treatment, and what from psychic? There is much confusion of thought, nor is the confusion confined to Christian Scientists and militant materialists.

The goal of physical treatment is, I believe, a healthy body, all that, and nothing more. For my part, I discern only one boundary to mark the confines of man's control over the organic world. Some day, and through advance of medical and allied science, we have the right to expect that man will have the power regularly to restore an organ—be it brain or other organ—to physiological structure and function. Through science, so much and no more. We do not attain through science, nor ever shall, to an integrated personality. The only method which holds out any legitimate promise of a healthy mind and integrated character is the old method which concerns itself with the impact of true ideas and high ideals upon the personality, and with the free will which accepts these dynamic forces into the life.

There are certain diseases for which, even in the present stage of medical knowledge, specific treatment is available. For instance, the specific treatment of a broken leg is rest of the damaged limb with the fragments in apposition. The specific treatment for diphtheria is antitoxin. The specific treatment for the psychoses is, I believe, psychic treatment. In conjunction with specific treatment it may be advisable, in some cases necessary, to use adjuvant treatment. For instance, chronic ill-health from poisoning might delay the union of a fracture, and the removal of the cause of poison might expedite recovery. Septic foci at the roots of the teeth are a common cause of poisoning, but no man in his senses would propose to treat broken legs solely by a routine pulling of teeth. Some forms of treatment advocated and applied in the psychoses and

the psycho-neuroses have about as much warrant in reason, or justification in experience, as such dental extractions would have.

In mental disease, as in other disease, the patient must be given the best possible environment, and all proper means taken to promote general health and well-being. But most important of all, specific treatment for the disease should be given, and the specific treatment is psychic, or, as I prefer to call it, spiritual.

My point here is well illustrated by the remark once made to me by an asylum medical officer. We were in the refractory ward. "When Nurse X is on duty," he said, "this ward is like a Sunday school." Now, assuredly, it was no corporeal force or influence from Nurse X which made the ward "like a Sunday school."

Under the term spiritual treatment, I would include an elucidation and interpretation of the psychic history of the patient, a sympathetic understanding of his difficulties, and encouragement and direction in facing and overcoming these difficulties. Often this will involve a reorientation of the patient to his fears and scruples and to his present total environment, both the actual environment and that projected by the patient's imagination. More, a reorientation with the present is often impossible till the patient is delivered from the past. Sometimes that deliverance can come only in terms of forgiveness. We are neglecting the wisdom of proverbial knowledge if we do not recognize that "conscience makes cowards of us all," and we neglect one of the experimentally ascertained results of physiology if we do not bear in mind that fear actually breaks down nerve cell tissue (Nissl's granules). Conscience and fear must be treated.

Recently I saw a middle-aged man suffering from an obvious neurosis. There were physical symptoms, but the whole aspect of the case proclaimed its psychic origin. The man had already had psychic treatment, and something, I judged, of the nature of psycho-analysis. As a matter of fact, the methods of Freud were as unnecessary in diagnosis as they would have been useless in treatment. As soon as the man's confidence had been gained, his story came out. He was a widower; in his loneliness and depression he had been suddenly tempted and had fallen into adultery. He added that thereafter he had "cried all night" and that "his conscience had been troubling him ever since." It appears to me obvious that a satisfactory reorientation for such a man can come only in terms of forgiveness and new hope. At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind that self-accusation

is by no means necessarily true accusation. The treatment for false self-accusation is not assurance of forgiveness, but deliverance from morbid self-depreciation and condemnation and reinstatement in merited self-respect.

In my practice in Korea, I find that the factors of major importance in the aetiology of the psycho-neuroses have reference to sex, to marriage, and the family, and to money and means of livelihood. In that civilization, as in our own, there exist, and are prevalent, gravest errors in judgment and failures in conduct relating to these subjects. In offering to my patients solutions for these and other difficulties inherent in the art of living, I make constant use of the words of Jesus. His teachings about sex, money, the family, fear, economics and the other problems which constantly appear and reappear in a psycho-neurological clinic, are strangely apposite, constructive and vital.

In the cases of definite psychosis, the patient is, of course, far less accessible to counsel and encouragement than in the psycho-neuroses, though even in the psychoses there is far more possibility of helpfulness through these methods than is commonly recognized. Even in cases where the patient is not accessible to what one might term the "psychological" method of approach, our therapeutic resources are not, I surmise, exhausted.

The New Testament contains a number of narratives of persons there described as "possessed of evil spirits," and describes their cure. The symptoms which these patients exhibit are not dissimilar from those of patients suffering from mania and other present-day types of insanity. The New Testament description of the symptoms is convincing, but the language raises difficulties. The term "spirit possession" suggests, to the mind of the civilization in which I live, the gross superstitions of the Orient about devils; or, to the mind of Western countries, associated perhaps with the strongly materialistic trend of our thought, it suggests half-defined ideas of some corporeal personality invading the body of the victim. These ideas are properly rejected, and they are not the ideas of the New Testament. It is instructive to note that the modern alienist, with his terms such as "compulsion" and "obsessions," describes the phenomena of his experience in language very similar to that of the New Testament. Indeed, what other terms can be used to describe, for instance, the case of a decorous person who became alienated from his proper habit and driven to obscene word and perverted action.

More especially in latter years I have been influenced in my treatment of the psychosis by the following consideration: The writers of the Gospel narrative had evidently come to believe that the One of whom they wrote, exercised an almost easy mastery over disease and even over the forces of Nature. Whether or not they had good evidence for that belief, I am not here concerned to disenss. My concern is this. Those same writers represent Christ as teaching that the cure of some forms of "those possessed with spirits" presents special difficulties. After the disciples had failed to cure the "boy possessed with an evil spirit" (a case, I take it, from the detailed description of the symptoms and their course, of long-standing epileptic dementia), Christ is reported to have said: "This sort cometh not forth but by prayer and fasting."

As Professor Hogg, of Madras, has pointed out, the inference is that while other sorts of disease may be controlled by other methods (including physical and chemical agents), this sort is to be cast out only by prayer and by prayer which costs. Obviously, there is no moral value associated with a prayer unless already the whole of the material and psychological resources of the physician praying for his patient have been offered in the treatment of a case. If these and the other spiritual requirements of prayer are complied with, there is, my experience leads me to think, evidence that prayer is a constructive and creative force. Telepathy may offer an analogy and a partial explanation to those who, without such analogy, find it an idea incredible that prayer should effect results and results not otherwise attainable in this difficult field of medical endeavour.

The hypothesis, then, which I advance concerning the relation between body and mind may be summed up thus:

The hypothesis takes cognizance of the facts of physiology and neurology. It accepts and reckons with these facts; at the same time, it resists the mechanistic inferences of a materialistic philosophy. The hypothesis relates itself to the arresting conclusions which the insight of modern mathematical physics has attained; at the same time, it is illumined by the genius and inspiration alike of Hebrew and Hellenic thought. It is a form of dualism, but is not content to leave matter and mind in two unrelated universes. It sees inorganic matter as thought that has taken form; the organic world it envisages as thought taking living form. In the human being, crown of a biological process in which the *élan vital* of creative evolution has given birth at last to man, it perceives an organism fashioned by the same forces that have

brought into being the animal world; it sees in him, also, a person, in whom in a way unique in Nature, conscious and self-conscious thought is enshrining itself in living form. The body is the instrument by, through and in which we, who are spirit, perceive meaning, hold memory, and achieve purpose. It may be pointed out that the analogy sometimes used concerning the relation between body and mind—that of a player and his instrument—fails to give proper recognition to the intimacy of the relationship which does in fact exist. Rather it may be said that *we* are the music of our personality, body and mind. The Greeks were not wrong when they listened for the “music of the spheres.” Of that greater music we also are a part. In that music, body and mind are related. We are living thoughts thinking thought. The *logos* has become flesh. The cosmos is intelligible.

CHARLES McLAREN

Severance

20. 2. 35

Dear Dr. Blair,

My visit to Pyeng Yang and the moving experience in which I shared when the Board came to its irrevocable decision about closing the Union Christian College have impelled me further to try and think through these so urgent problems with which the Christian Church is faced in this land. In so far as my thinking may be of any value I would like to share it with you and others.

In the first place may I say that my estimate of Wednesday's action is that it was a victory and not a defeat; and we Christians can exult in a victory, even if it be a Pyrrhic victory, because we, and we alone, know that resurrection is the corner stone of the universe.

I confess that I went up with a certain critical feeling. I want to say that I came back with enhanced regard for those who have fought a good fight.

I have tried to get set out in my own thinking and expression what I was saying (and you rightly took exception to) on Wednesday evening, about 'a merely negative witness.' I think what I want to say is something like this: Active affirmation of God's truth, especially affirmation relevant and applied to the ideology in the midst of which we live should characterise our witness, this in addition to contradiction, plain and unmistakable, of the falsehoods which are being declared and indoctrinated.

I think the situation on Wednesday was as you envisaged and described it, and not as I at first theoretically supposed it to be. I am not saying that first and last no possible ground of criticism can be found concerning the U. C. C. policy and its application, but if there be criticism of you folk now, from me, it would be only that type of criticism which St. Paul admitted when he said, "Not as though I already attained or already perfect, but this one thing, press on to the goal....."

I think that on Wednesday the Board took the only remaining Christian

Charles McLaren

course. One cannot and should not attempt to make unwilling martyrs of those whose (natural enough) pre-occupation is to find a modus vivendi; nor can one well make a spear head from a lump of matter.

You may think me inconsistent when I go on to say that I am not satisfied that the inevitable Christian course for other institutions is just to say 'No attendance.' I ask that you will believe that in holding this position I do not take it with a conscience made uneasy by sense of compromise and unChristian concession. The principle itself, as I see it now, is that we be resolved strongly to maintain and clearly to declare our Christian witness concerning the obligation resting upon all men to fear and obey the Creator God, to follow the truth, and to abhor idolatry. The question remains what method shall we use.

I think it must be admitted that consent to visit the shrines by Christian schools has in the past, in most cases, been given with misgiving and reluctance, and with some uneasiness of conscience, lest the going was a compromise and at best, "the best of a bad job." All that, I think, is not good enough. If Christian schools and Christian men are to go at all it should be with a conscience void of offense and satisfied that actively they are doing their Christian duty.

I spoke with you of something - a point not usually made in our Christian circles - I have been trying to get at about the shrines, namely, the ethical values for which they stand and - even more difficult - their possible contact point with true religion and the Christian faith.

Ethical values should not be difficult to see. The shrines do stand for disciplines of various sorts, for self-renunciation, for beauty, and for the natural and proper respect which we should pay to those who went before and into whose labours and sacrifice we have entered.

Moreover, a specific injunction from our Lord Himself comes to us Christians that we should render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's. I definitely am uneasy, if I merely stay away from shrines, lest I be in danger of less than complete obedience to that word of our Lord.

To come to the more difficult problem. In how far (ideally) may the shrines be places of contact with true religion? I am convinced and allow that the shrines are in part places of superstition and idolatry; and those sins we Christians must abhor. But another side - In the midst of Athenian superstition and idolatry St. Paul discovered some true yearning of the human soul after the divine. Very much indeed, and in all humility, I want to say to every yearning - *and perhaps especially at the shrines I might find him -* Japanese soul, "Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship we declare unto you."

Much has been said latterly in Government and other circles about the necessity of "clarifying the national polity." Instructions have been issued to all schools in this connection with a view to "mobilizing the national spirit." It seems to me that the Church should accept the dangerous and urgent responsibility which has been thrust upon her alike by the order of the Government and the inner necessity of her own divine mission. Who but she is in a position to bring the needed clarity, to interpret Japan to herself and ^{to} tell Japan of her veritable place *- yes, even messianic -* in the divine plan? Our Saviour and Japan's Saviour said, "I came not to destroy but to fulfill." Is not the fulfillment of Japan's yearning for a divine emperor, son of the gods, found in its fulness in the Christian gospel? Our Lord and his apostles taught clearly that the authority, even of the secular ruler, ^{indeed} comes from God himself, and is it not at the very center of the Christian message that Son of man is Son of God?

As the Edinburgh report wisely and humbly stresses, the first requisite with which we Christians must be equipped if we are to huddle this so difficult question of Church and State, is with a sense of our own insufficiency as finite beings and of our own guilt as sinners. Equally necessary, it seems to me, is the spirit which is prepared to give ourselves - our very lives if need be - for the good of Japan. We Christians must out-patriot the patriots.

In a matter of such desperate import for the individual and for the state as is this matter, there is, I believe, no call and no excuse for ~~hesitation~~ *either for silence or merely for smooth & easy words* ~~or inactivity~~.

4.

In all my attitudes to the shrines one of the big determining motives with me is a desire ~~to~~ really to serve the Japanese people.

I can conceive no greater dis-service that the Christian Church could do to Japan at the present time, than quietly to agree *with dangerous pretensions or with lege majeste against the Divine Majesty* that was the fatal thing which happened in Russia. The Church raised no voice of protest or of true leadership - - the result, revolution and a materialistic communism and the practical death of the Church.

To return to the matter of the actual application, re the shrines, of the principle of active Christian witness. I think under different circumstances different decision and different conduct should be adopted.

For instance, when McCune was told to bow to the shrine of the Sun Goddess I think he made the only possible Christian answer, "No." Then the Yenchun Presbytery is being ordered under duress and without opportunity of declaration of Christian principles to visit shrines I think there is one proper answer, "No."

On the other hand when full explanation is made before hand to the authorities, when permission is given by the authorities, when a time other than the time of the ceremonies is chosen, when publicly at the shrines prayer is made to Almighty God, and when the significance of the prayer is further explained to the watching detective, I think not compromise, but Christian witness, has been achieved. This happened in our mission. Nevertheless, constant vigilance is necessary. Already in our mission field promises made by officials re the shrine have not been kept.

May I earnestly ask your station's prayers for Severance and for the still surviving institutions, Union and other, Presbyterian and Methodist.

The fact that the U. C. C. has surrendered its existence for the Christian witness in a world where nationalistic idolatry is so menacing, should, I believe, come to the rest of us not as a temptation to seek by all means a modus vivendi,

5.

but as a sacred challenge that we shall not fail in our obligation of Christian witness. Again I ask your prayers.

It is all very difficult, but not too difficult for our God.

Yours very sincerely,

Chas. I. McLaren

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
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Author	Chas.I.McLaren
Publisher	Foreign Mission Committee,Presbyterian Church of Victoria,Australia
Pub.Year(s)	1943
Language	English

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